Computing near-optimal stable cost allocations for cooperative games by lagrangian relaxation
发布时间：2024-02-18
点击次数：
- DOI码：
- 10.1287/ijoc.2016.0707
- 发表刊物：
- INFORMS Journal on Computing
- 摘要：
- For a cost-sharing cooperative game with an empty core, we study the problem of calculating a near-optimal cost allocation that satisfies coalitional stability constraints and maximizes the total cost allocated to all players. One application of such a problem is finding the minimum level of subsidy required to stabilize the grand coalition. To obtain solutions, we propose a new generic framework based on Lagrangian relaxation, which has several advantages over existing work that exclusively relies on linear programming (LP) relaxation techniques. Our approach can generate better cost allocations than LP-based algorithms, and is also applicable to a broader range of problems. To illustrate the efficiency and performance of the Lagrangian relaxation framework, we investigate two different facility location games. The results demonstrate that our new approach can find better cost allocations than the LP-based algorithm, or provide alternative optimal cost allocations for cases that the LP-based algorithm can also solve to optimality.
- 第一作者：
- Lindong Liu
- 合写作者：
- Xiangtong Qi,Zhou Xu
- 论文编号：
- [2]
- 卷号：
- 28
- 期号：
- 4
- 页面范围：
- 687-702
- 是否译文：
- 否
- 发表时间：
- 2016-10-20
